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1. Introduction 
The 100-year anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War has been commemorated in many 
different ways.1 However, surprisingly, almost nobody paid more than scant attention to 
remembering the role of China, although she provided the main place of action and – in 
spite of being herself neutral in the conflict – was the actual victim of it.2 In this sense, 
the remembrance of this war repeats the similar constellation during the time of the 
actual conflict: foreigners decided and fought over and in China, which was nominally 
sovereign but de facto had no say, and she, in turn, was mainly concerned about cutting 
her losses. In those days, hardly anyone from outside China felt pity for her. More 
surprising, however, is the fact that the Chinese themselves – then and now – though 
pitying themselves to some degree, mainly felt and still feel anger that things could have 
developed at all up to this point. This weakness has been a national disgrace damaging 
China’s reputation in the world – the main argument goes.3  
 Also in the long run the emphasis in remembrance is put on the emblematic 
aspect of the war as a global political event, in which China merely figures as a 
coincidence or a footnote to history. Did the Russo-Japanese War have no meaningful 
consequences for China then? And did it not alter the role of China in history at all? 
Would everything have remained the same if the war had not taken place where it did? 
   Certainly, seen from the perspective of China’s modern history, the Russo-
Japanese War was only one amongst many other catastrophes that ravaged the country. 
The reason why it is not regarded of great significance is partly because of the so-called 
                                                           
1
 Symposiums were held in Tokyo, St Petersburg, and also Great Britain, Israel, the US and Germany.  
2
 A few exceptions are identifiable: Ian Nish, “China and the Russo-Japanese War” (online paper for a 
symposium in the Suntory Centre, April 2004) and partly Enatsu Yoshiki, (paper for the symposium of 
the German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo 2004): “The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the 
Modern History of North-eastern China (Manchuria)”. Nish has been working for decades on the Russo-
Japanese War on the basis of Japanese and Western sources and he publishes a reprint-series with 
Western war reports which he also uses to define China’s role in it. (Chinese sources are, however, not 
considered). Enatsu Yoshiki, whose paper is not yet accessible, has been working for some time on the 
history of Manchuria in the late Qing period.    
3
 See, e.g., the war’s representation in Chinese school textbooks, which only mention it in passing, or 
diverse comments on Chinese websites commemorating the “100-year anniversary of the Russo-Japanese 
War”. 
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“Boxer Protocol” of 1901 (which is generally considered to be the nadir of China’s 
international standing),4 the significance of which, one thinks, cannot be overestimated. 
Another reason very probably was also the special status of Manchuria, which is, from 
the Chinese – or more precisely: “Han”-Chinese – perspective, not regarded as 
belonging to the core area of China but is “beyond the mountain pass (guanwai)”: a 
potential “barbarian land”. Nonetheless it was the home territory of the Manchu dynasty 
ruling China at the time.  
 In the following, some selected perspectives shall be presented in order to clarify 
China’s role in this war: first, the government’s perspective in terms of diplomacy is 
taken into consideration; secondly, societal perspectives are discussed for which a look 
into the general cultural perception of both combatants in China, i.e. the Chinese image 
of Russia and Japan respectively, is needed. Then – as the focal point – attention is paid 
to the reporting in the Chinese press. Here, a distinction is made between three 
categories of publications, each exemplified through one outstanding case, even though 
this categorisation is somewhat simplifying the matter:5 1. the revolutionary type (this 
category is addressed in more detail); 2. the reformist type; 3. the liberal-bourgeois one. 
Finally, this is followed by a tentative outline of a Manchurian perspective, and at the 
end this essay summarises the effects of the war on China, providing some hypotheses 
to answer the questions raised above. 
              
 
 
 
                                                           
4
 Cf. recent historical overviews such as the one by Wasserstrom, which regards the 20th century as a 
meaningful time unit also for China and thus draws a historical line from China’s low point of her 
international position in 1901 to China’s entry into the WTO as a “normal country” at the next turn of the 
century. See Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, ed., Twentieth Century China. New Approaches, London and New 
York, 2003, pp. 9-15.    
5
 At times, the types also overlap, but when considering them in total and with regard to the respective 
representative people, specific differences can be detected.   
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2. The Government’s Perspective: China and its Difficulties in Diplomatic Action 
out of a Weak Position 
China, which traditionally defined itself as “all under heaven (tianxia)” and tended to 
subsume foreign relations on a theoretical level under the tribute system,6 had great 
difficulties with entering into the world of diplomacy. Only because of massive pressure 
from outside, i.e. primarily the Opium Wars in the mid-19th century, did China 
eventually allow Western legations to be located in Beijing7 and consent to set up some 
kind of Foreign Office (zongli yamen) to take charge of all affairs concerning foreigners 
which up to then had been organised disparately. Symptomatic of China’s aversion was 
the frequent recruitment of foreign staff; further, it was again foreigners who were 
instrumental in translating the fundamentals of international law which regulated 
diplomatic relations.8 Another typical indication of Chinese reluctance was the fact that 
China’s first official ambassador abroad was a foreigner himself (Anton Burlingame 
1868). Only after several years of enforced residence of Western legations in Beijing 
did China at the end of the 1870s finally move to station Chinese ambassadors in the 
West and in Japan.9 These ambassadors, however, were scorned as “failed existences” 
at home, their households at times even being threatened.10 Due to the low prestige of 
contacts with foreign countries – at least in “official” Beijing11 – the ruling Qing-court 
                                                           
6
 De facto, pragmatic compromises had to be repeatedly made in history. Nonetheless, the construct of the 
tribute system with China’s emperor as the “centre of the world” remained ideologically effective 
throughout.  
7
 This happened as a result of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 which ended the second Opium War. 
However, the respective treaty obligations were not put into practice until the British and the French 
troops attacked again and destroyed the Summer Palace in 1860 in order to “teach the Chinese a lesson.”   
8
 Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law was translated by W.A.P. Martin and published in 
1864. 
9
 Cf. Chen Feng, Die Entdeckung des Westens. Chinas erste Botschafter in Europa, 1866-1894. Frankfurt 
a. M., 2001. Similar to the ambassadors in the West, Huang Zunxian also wrote down his impressions of 
Japan. For Huang, see Kamachi Noriko, Reform in China. Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model. 
Cambridge, 1981. 
10
 A drastic example was the case of Guo Songtao, whose family home was attacked by enraged 
compatriots upon his entering into office as the first Chinese ambassador to London. Cf. Yen-P’ing Hao 
and Erh-Min Wang, “Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations, 1840-95,” in The Cambridge 
History of China, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, part 2, ed. by John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, New 
York 1980, pp. 142-201. See there p. 187.    
11
 Southern Chinese, or more precisely Chinese living in coastal areas were traditionally more “open” 
towards the outside. It was not entirely coincidental that Cantonese, e.g., made up a large percentage of 
reformers and revolutionaries.  
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could not and did not want to train outstanding diplomats and regulate such competence 
in the long term.12                
 In terms of foreign policy, Li Hongzhang was certainly the most prominent 
figure of the late 19th century in China. Though he neither received any diplomatic 
training nor spoke any foreign language, he still led (albeit periodical ups and downs in 
his career) the majority of the most important and most delicate negotiations for China 
until his death in 1901. On the one hand, Li set great hope on Russia, China’s oldest 
“treaty partner” amongst all “Western” powers,13 since Russia still mostly restrained 
herself during the 19th century’s struggle to obtain concession areas in China and even 
helped via the Triple Intervention of 1895 (together with France and Germany) to force 
Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula back to China after the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894/5.14 Furthermore, as Li had been invited to Nicholas II’s coronation in 1896 (and 
was probably frequently bribed by the Russians), he was believed to be pro-Russian. On 
the other hand, it was Li who, though punished by the court for the defeat of his 
Beiyang Fleet and Anhui Army, which had virtually fought alone against the Japanese 
nation in the Sino-Japanese war, had to sign the harsh Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki of 
1895. The Japanese had insisted that he was the only authority appropriate to sign, and 
thus the Chinese court could not help but end his punishment and quickly call him back. 
Aged Li had even less reason to sympathise with the Japanese considering the fact that 
he was attacked and wounded by a Japanese fanatic during the negotiations. The 
protocol of the Shimonoseki Treaty negotiations further shows that Japan, in the 
meantime, had learned to cleverly use Western diplomatic tactics while Li tried to 
                                                           
12
 Until the end of the empire in 1911, only 13 out of 54 Chinese ambassadors acquired knowledge about 
international relations during their training. Cf. Chen Feng: op. cit. p. 21.   
13
 The first treaty between Russia and China, the Treaty of Nerchinsk, was concluded in 1689; the 
Russians had a permanent mission in Beijing already since the early 18th century – that is more than 100 
years earlier than the other Western powers!  
14
 For a fairly recent overview on Sino-Russian relations since the 19th century see, S.C.M. Paine, 
Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier. Armonk and London, 1996; see also 
Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of 
Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century. Armonk and London, 2003. Paine’s work puts 
more emphasis on matters concerning the history of diplomacy whereas Lukin focuses on the Russian 
image of China. From a Chinese-American perspective, Immanuel Hsü, an expert of history of diplomacy, 
has been working on various aspects of Sino-Russian relations during the 19th century since the 1960s.  
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appeal to Confucian morals and “common” cultural roots.15 Unsurprisingly, this did not 
keep Japan from looking after her own political interests – and again, Li was pilloried at 
home for the treaty conditions which were regarded as opprobrious. After the Triple 
Intervention, which had disburdened him at least a little bit of the defeat, he managed to 
carry through a secret alliance with Russia (allegedly for protection against Japan) at 
home in 1896. This alliance was particularly pushed by the Russian Minister of Finance: 
Vitte.16 The public was not informed about the content in detail, but this secret alliance 
led to visible consequences by China’s granting concessions for the Trans-Siberian 
Railway to be prolonged across Manchuria, allowing the Russians also to protect it. 17 
This set up important physical requirements for possible future intervention by Russia 
in Manchuria, which, in turn, raised new anxieties in Japan, and thus the secret alliance 
can be said to have contributed indirectly on the way to the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War. 
 “Pro-Russian” Li was however not the only agent whose voice carried weight in 
Chinese foreign policy. Soon after the Triple Intervention and the secret Sino-Russian 
alliance, Russia openly dropped her conciliatory attitude towards China, and the pro-
Russian atmosphere in China quickly turned into the opposite.18 The first shock was the 
fact that Russia – de facto prearranged with Germany19 – took aggressively advantage 
of the Jiaozhou crisis of 1897/98. The murder of two German missionaries provided 
Germany with the long waited-for pretext to assert her territorial claims in China, 
whereupon the Russians also claimed similar rights for themselves, since St Petersburg 
in the meantime had changed its Far-Eastern policy from acting on Vitte’s maxim of a 
“peaceful penetration” 20  through “railway imperialism” towards an aggressive 
                                                           
15
 Translated excerpts of the negotiation protocol can be found in Cheng Pei-kai and Michael Lestz with 
Jonathan D. Spence, eds., The Search for Modern China. A Documentary Collection, New York and 
London, 1999, pp. 173-181.  
16
 In his memoirs, Vitte gives his views on this and also documents his contact with Li Hongzhang. See 
Graf Vitte, Erinnerungen, chapter 2, Berlin, 1923. 
17
 Li Hongzhang, however, insisted that the railway line should not be constructed by the Russian state 
but officially by a private company. 
18
 Russia-critical voices already existed before 1897/98. Cf. Don C. Price, Russia and the Roots of the 
Chinese Revolution, 1896-1911, chapter 3, Cambridge, Mass., 1974. However, the Triple Intervention 
and also Russia’s less prominent imperialistic attitude in comparison to other Western powers had 
positively affected public opinion in China on Russia before.   
19
 Cf. Paine, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 
20
 This motto was pursued by Count Vitte; however, he had been edged aside by other advisors at the 
Russian court who favoured an openly imperialistic policy.  
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expansion policy. During the war, spokesmen of this agenda (amongst others the 
Minister of War Kuropatkin who was relatively moderate at first, and the more hawkish 
military officer Alekseev, who was responsible for the regions in Russia’s Far East) 
would be directly involved in Manchuria. In 1898 the Russians occupied the Liaodong 
Peninsula, the Japanese seizure of which they had successfully obstructed in 1895, as 
noted before. The Russians immediately enforced – against the resistance of the local 
residents – permission to construct the South Manchurian Railway that connected the 
peninsula to the Trans-Siberian-Trans-Manchurian railway. This behaviour – in just the 
same manner as the one of the other Western powers, which asserted territorial claims 
after the Jiaozhou crisis in China as well – levelled, in the eyes of the Chinese, Russia’s 
imperialism with that of the Western powers. Soon after, under the pretext of 
suppressing the “anti-foreign Boxers” who attacked the Manchurian Railway because its 
construction enabled Russian troops to easily arrive in the country, the Russians invaded 
Manchuria in 1900. Along with this, reports on Russian cruelties increasingly appeared 
in Chinese newspapers. These cruelties also affected completely uninvolved parts of the 
population – as in the Blagoveshchensk massacre – and shaped the image of the “brutal 
Cossacks” in China. 21  Although Russian diplomats officially declared that the 
occupation of Manchuria was “only temporary”, they repeatedly remained evasive 
about any concrete steps of retreat (Li Hongzhang, the former mediator, had died in the 
meantime anyway and Count Vitte had been outmanoeuvred at the Russian court), and 
ultimately the negotiated gradual retreat starting in 1902 was simply stopped at the 
second stage of 1903 – de facto it was even reversed. As a consequence, almost nobody 
at the Chinese court trusted the Russians anymore. Instead, they were considered at best 
as too dangerous to risk an affront. Thus, at the time of the outbreak of the war, there 
were barely any pro-Russian voices on the Chinese governmental side, but rather 
caution and – at times – fear prevailed.  
                                                           
21
 Some examples of Chinese reports are cited by Price, op. cit. Also cf. Paine, op. cit., pp. 212-214, who 
particularly draws on Russian reports. Also, the Russian archive materials used by Kusber show that after 
the outbreak of the war, the Russians did not consider the Chinese neutrality as “worth respecting” and 
thus acted ruthlessly. Jan Kusber, “Siegeserwartungen und Schuldzuweisungen. Die Autokratie und das 
Militär im Russisch-Japanischen Krieg 1904/05,“ in Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05, ed. by 
Josef Kreiner, Göttingen, 2005, pp. 99-106. See there pp. 107-108. As a British observer of the war on the 
Russian side, Brooke confirms the Chinese’s long-lasting remembrance of the Russian massacres. Lord 
Brooke, An Eye-Witness in Manchuria, London, 1905, p. 254.   
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 On the other side, after the shock of the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, the official relationship to Japan had improved in the meantime. After the 
Boxer disaster, even the Chinese court realised that China needed to develop politically 
and thus started the so-called “New Policy”.22 In this respect, China strongly oriented 
herself towards Japan since Japan appeared to be culturally related and was also ruled 
by a monarch. And obviously, Japan had “successfully” learnt from the West: a fact the 
Chinese had had to experience painfully first-hand in the Sino-Japanese War. 
Accordingly, Qing-officials in various provinces had not only started to send students to 
Western countries but also increasingly to Japan. Japan, at the turn of the century, had 
thus become China’s teacher, and influential officials such as Zhang Zhidong (who used 
to be Li Hongzhang’s constant rival)23 propagated the Japanese model.24 However, the 
Chinese were not sure to which extent Japan would be capable to stand up to an 
opponent such as Russia. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the predominant 
viewpoint at the court was to take care to avoid being dragged into this conflict even 
though it was to be decided on Chinese territory. The danger of the Russo-Japanese 
conflict to be set mainly on Chinese territory, namely Manchuria, had been kept in 
perspective before already, just like the fact that China simply could not do anything to 
prevent it. As it appeared uncertain which side would win, an alliance with either side 
was estimated as only increasing the potential damage for China. Thus, China decided 
to remain strictly neutral – a solution which also the major Great Powers on principle 
considered the best. Neutrality per se involved China as a whole – but was only partly 
enforceable in the combat area Manchuria. 25  Its realisation, in fact, was often 
troublesome in practice. In this regard, not only the combatants repeatedly complained 
but also the British, who were not directly involved, at times criticised the Chinese to 
                                                           
22
 The “classic” study on this topic is Douglas Reynolds, China, 1898-1912. The Xinzheng Revolution and 
Japan, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, though his point of view has been also questioned as overly optimistic in 
recent years. 
23
 This does not imply that Li was per se pro-Russian and Zhang always pro-Japanese. In the course of 
years, both politicians also changed their (usually contrary) diplomatic standpoints on diverse conflicts of 
the late 19th century depending on their individual evaluation of certain situations.   
24
 Best-known is Zhang’s Quanxuepian (Exhortation to study) of 1898. Quanxuepian propagates the idea 
that learning from Japan enables one “to earn the double profit by only making half the effort”, though the 
“perfected” model was still to be found in the West. Cf. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 44.   
25
 For the Japanese perspective on the diplomatic operations, see Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of 
Japan, 1894-1922, vol. 2, 1978, pp. 176-199: “The problems of Chinese neutrality”. 
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“exaggerate” their neutrality by prohibiting deliveries into the war zone of anything 
which could be considered war material – and by this harmed British trading interests.26   
 Chinese foreign policy goals during the war, in short, were mainly to not get 
involved into the conflict and to hold, at least nominally, on to Chinese supremacy over 
Manchuria for the time being and, as far as possible, to secure it for the future. Hence a 
clear victory of one side was not necessarily desirable for the Chinese government as a 
stalemate would be the least perilous outcome for China’s already fragile status.      
         
3. Societal Perspectives 
3.1. Cultural perceptions of the opponents 
3.1.1. The Chinese image of Russia 
Before the war, there had been mainly two information channels about Russia: one was 
the inner-Chinese press which was partially funded by foreigners and also run by them, 
e.g. in the treaty ports.27 Amongst foreign activities, the press of the missionaries played 
a quite important role. Apart from general informative articles on Russia (often taken 
over from the Western press), also revolutionary activities were addressed, which were 
critically evaluated in this type of press. At best, rebellious approaches were met with 
some sympathy when pointing to the Russian autocracy, but terrorist activities like the 
ones of Narodnaja volja (“will of the people”), which emerged from the V narod (“into 
the people”)-movement, shaped the image of “dangerous Russia” where such godless 
endeavours existed. A positive re-evaluation of this information was to happen only 
after the turn of the century in Chinese revolutionary circles.  
                                                           
26
 Cf. various documents in: British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Part I, Series E: Asia. Vol. 11: China 
and the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05. Vol. 11: doc. 47, 63, 95, 154, 196; Vol. 12: doc. 246, University 
Publications of America, 1993. 
27
 On this, see Natascha Vittinghoff, Die Anfänge des Journalismus in China (1860-1911), Wiesbaden, 
2002; Andrea Janku, Nur leere Reden. Politischer Diskurs und die Shanghaier Presse im China des 
späten 19. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden, 2003; Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity, 
and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872-1912, Cambridge, Mass., 2004. 
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 The second pre-war channel of information on Russia which only started at the 
end of the 19th century was strongly oriented towards the Japanese press. Newspapers 
and journals in China, and – beginning from the turn of the century – Chinese journals 
released in Japan, drew their knowledge usually from Japanese sources. 28  In 
modernising Japan, in turn, the general view of Russia as being politically backward 
was predominant. Also, Russia was increasingly perceived as a rival in East Asia. While 
its revolutionary endeavours were positively evaluated as a comprehensible outcry 
against the backwardly autocracy (noting, for sure, that the Tennô could in no way be 
compared with the Russian Tsar), Russian ambitions in the Far East were eyed with 
suspicion. The Chinese publications that took over such Japanese reports also adopted 
this critical perspective on Russia; these – despite the already named options in foreign 
policy of a Li Hongzhang – made for a predominantly negative image of Russia in 
China. Thus, it can be concluded that Russia’s image in China had been shaped not only 
by direct contact between both countries, but rather was strongly influenced by third 
factors – such as Western and Japanese media opinions. Apart from the already 
mentioned foreign-policy conflicts since 1898, these media opinions contributed to the 
increasingly negative image of Russia from the turn of the century onwards.   
 At the outbreak of the war, Russia was still considered as possibly victorious in 
battle, but when the news of her defeats arrived, the image of Russia in China changed 
into contempt. Japan’s victory, in turn, was re-framed as the victory of the “yellow 
race” against the “white race”, which went well with the Japanese. Since Russia was 
contemporaneously going through tumultuous times domestically, this was taken in 
China as evidence that the days of tsarism were numbered, and that it should be 
regarded as a historical anachronism. However, people close to the establishment in 
China saw the development of the Russian Empire also as a warning sign because 
Russia’s political structure was considered as similar to that of China: an agrarian 
country with an autocratic government. As we will see later on, in this regard there was 
                                                           
28
 Also, several Japanese-funded press products existed in China. For an overview, see Nakashita 
Masaharu, Shinbun ni miru Nitchû kankeishi: Chûgoku no nihonjin keieishi [History of Sino-Japanese 
relations as mirrored in the Press: Japanese-run newspapers in China], Tôkyô, 1996. It should be noted 
that Japanese press products were in turn likely to orient themselves towards the Western press, in 
particular the English-language one.  
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congruence between this estimation of the government and the revolutionary critics – 
even if their respective attached interests were diametrically opposed to each other.  
 
3.1.2. The Chinese image of Japan 
In marked contrast to Russia, Japan’s image in China before and after the war changed 
for the better. Though China had been miserably humiliated by Japan in the Sino-
Japanese War and thus bore some grudge towards her previously “little brother” 
because of his “impious” behaviour, many Chinese – at a time when social Darwinism 
was prominent – also admired Japan for her success. The Qing rulers were blamed more 
and more for the Chinese misery as they appeared as simply incapable whilst the 
Japanese appeared to be able to successfully defend their interests on the international 
stage. Thus, the image of the “aggressive little brother” changed quickly for the better 
despite the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Chinese students going to Japan played a major part 
in contributing to this image: at the turn of the century, many Chinese (not only 
government-sponsored ones) travelled to Japan to study there and learn about Western 
achievements as transmitted (and filtered) by Japan.29  Japan had turned into a role 
model of how to become successful in the modern world. While many Chinese 
intellectuals were politically frustrated after the failure of the Chinese reform movement 
of 1898, Japan conveyed the impression of dynamic and hope. Thus, many Chinese 
were sympathetic towards the Japanese at the outbreak of the war, harbouring also the 
subtle feeling of belonging to the same “race” somehow, whereas the Russians appeared 
to be more “alien”. When Japan scored fast victories, the Chinese were impressed that 
such a “young” and small country unmasked “the big bear” as a simple paper tiger. 
Object of special admiration was also the unwavering support the whole Japanese 
nation seemed to provide for the war, whereas with Russia, on the contrary, it was 
continuously highlighted that she was poor and that her people consequently had little 
patriotic enthusiasm. Since China was regarded in a very similar way, criticism of 
                                                           
29
 See Paula Harrell, Sowing the Seeds of Change. Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895-1905, 
Stanford, 1992; or Sanetô Keishû. Chûgokujin Nihon ryûgakushi [History of Chinese Students studying in 
Japan], Tôkyô, 1960; and Huang Fuqing, Qingmo LiuRi Xuesheng [Chinese Students studying in Japan 
during the late Qing period], Taipei, second ed. 1983 (first ed. 1975).  
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Russia also often intended Chinese self-criticism while Japan represented the positive 
example of China’s hopes for the future.      
 
3.2. Contemporary comments 
3.2.1. Revolutionary press commentaries 
When in April 1903 Russia suddenly started to delay her previously assured withdrawal 
of troops from Manchuria, China was alarmed. Radicalising intellectuals in Shanghai as 
well as Chinese students studying in Japan initiated in close cooperation with each other 
(and following a Japanese model), outright “Anti-Russia”-campaigns, which continued 
until the end of the war in 1905.30 At first a “volunteer’s corps to fight against Russia” 
was founded. Even though this had a foremost symbolic meaning since the Chinese 
government quickly ordered it to dissolve, being under diplomatic pressure, it still 
revealed that there were people willing to give the government and its diplomatic 
activities (at a time when China was trying to take a harder line towards Russia) societal 
support. Correspondingly, the activists felt alienated and frustrated when their initiative 
was officially rejected by the government on the ground that this was none of their 
business.31 After the enforced disbandment of the corps – which had been linked to 
military training at radicalised schools in Shanghai under the aegis of Cai Yuanpei, who 
was later apostrophised the “educator of China”32 – a daily newspaper was founded in 
Shanghai by the end of 1903 which dedicated itself to this conflict and continued the 
fight verbally: the Eshi Jingwen (lit. “Alarming news of Russian affairs”) (figure 1).33 
As the editorial shows, the editors saw it as their task to end the apathy in China and to 
encourage all social classes to put up resistance – which implicated that the government 
                                                           
30
 About the activities especially in Japan in 1903 see Harrell, op. cit., pp. 131-139. In the PRC a 
compilation of relevant articles from 1901-1905 was published under the name “Anti-Russia Movement”. 
See Tianshi Yang and Xuezhuang Wang, eds. Ju’e Yundong 1901-1905 [Anti-Russia Movement 1901-
1905], Beijing, 1979. The term “Anti-Russia Movement” had however existed already before.  
31
 Harrell, op. cit., pp. 137 and 139.  
32
 This is the title of the biography by William J. Duiker, Ts’ai Yüan-p’ei. Educator of Modern China  
Pennsylvania, 1977. Later, Cai temporarily became minister of education after the founding of the 
Republic and was president of Beijing University during the May Fourth period. He had studied in France 
and Germany.  
33
 The newspaper started publication on December 15, 1903. 
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was obviously not able to do so on its own. Viewed in this light, these press activities 
were an unprecedented attempt of a political movement in China, related to society as a 
whole. In order to achieve this goal, articles were preferably written in the less 
prestigious vernacular, and explicitly addressed the most diverse social groups: from 
administrative bodies to women and even children; from secret societies to bandits or 
religious people and atheists; from officials to prostitutes as well as all kinds of 
minorities, since the matter was seen as a national affair that involved everybody.34 The 
common warning at that time was the perishing of entire nations (which also had been 
often invoked by Liang Qichao – see below, symbolised by the cases of Poland and 
India).35 Such a fate was instantly presented as the dangerous alternative in case of 
societal non-action.36 The reader was further informed about the actual state of the 
Russo-Japanese negotiations on Manchuria and Korea (the failure of which would cause 
the outbreak of the war). These pieces of information, however, were evidently taken 
from the Japanese press and thus clearly showed where the editors’ sympathies lay. 
Also, a cartoon reminded the readership of the impending splitting-up of China – one of 
the few cartoons that were not taken over from Japanese newspapers but from an 
English one (ill. 2). 37  (This shows, by the way, that such a non-commercial daily 
newspaper only worked because of massive content take-overs. A revolutionary product 
like this one could not afford a big staff of fulltime employees anyway). 
 In another cartoon, in this case a Chinese one (ill. 3), the Chinese standpoint was 
characterised as follows: Russia is offering the Chinese government to through a ring 
(Manchuria) to it (i.e. in negotiations) but France and Japan intervene. The commentary 
explains that this should be a matter that only involves Russia and China, and the fact 
that Russia has still not returned Manchuria is an affront only towards China. But the 
Chinese people do not care and the government in China is incapable, corrupt and 
                                                           
34
 No. 1, December 15, 1903, reprint pp. 002-003. 
35
 By this, Liang wanted to warn against the British and Russian danger as it was exactly these two 
nations that “eliminated” the mentioned two nations of Poland and India. Cf. Price, op. cit., p. 75. This he 
had obviously taken over from the Japanese press: as early as 1884, on the occasion of the Franco-
Chinese War, the influential Japanese scholar and philosopher of “enlightenment”, Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
had mocked China correspondingly with a drawing of China as the “Poland of East Asia”. (This drawing 
had appeared in the Japanese daily newspaper Jiji shinpô on October 16, 1884).    
36
 No. 1, reprint Tapei 1983, p. 003. 
37
 No. 1, reprint p. 008. 
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fearful. Since the Russians are aware of that, they bribe people and rely on military 
intimidation, i.e. they use the carrot and stick approach.38 Self-evidently, the Japanese 
cannot accept this as they are “close neighbours” – in short: a clear apology for 
Japanese interference!39 France, being allied with Russia, thus asked for an audience 
with the Qing Wang, the Manchu prince in charge of foreign policy in China, and by 
this, in turn, highlighted her potential of interference.40 – Here, primarily the dilemma of 
the Chinese government caught in the middle of the different powers is satirised, but 
likewise, the indifference of the Chinese people is targeted, and it turns out that Japan 
was the only one to take charge of safeguarding Manchuria’s interests! 
 When the war broke out, the Eshi Jingwen instantly opposed the officially 
declared neutrality since it was not protecting the life of the Chinese people living in 
Manchuria. This is remarkable in so far as there was not much interest in the fate of the 
local population in Chinese publications elsewhere (see below)! In a very one-sided way, 
the Eshi Jingwen pointed out the killing and abuse of Chinese by Russians. With a 
drawing (ill. 4) that addressed the inferno of 20,000 Chinese in Yingkou, who had been 
shelled by the Russian army despite their declared obedience, the newspaper 
emphasised its appeal to actively fight against the “enemies”41 – which stood in marked 
contrast to the officially declared neutrality at the outbreak of the war. (However, a 
direct call for fighting alongside the Japanese was avoided). 42  By this, it de facto 
attacked the incapability of the Chinese government that would become responsible for 
the imminent loss of China’s sovereignty.43 
                                                           
38
 That this tactic was “typical” for Russia, seemed to be corroborated by the “Testament of Peter the 
Great” (the authenticity of which is more than doubtful) often quoted also in China in which supposedly 
Peter the Great commended this method to his descendants for gaining domination of the whole world. 
(The “testament” was translated into the Chinese vernacular and printed in Eshi Jingwen on December 17 
and 18, 1903, reprint pp. 022-024 and pp. 031-032).    
39
 Eshi Jingwen January 1, 1904, reprint pp. 138-139. 
40
 Ibid. p. 140. 
41
 February 23, 1904, reprint pp. 434-435. 
42
 February 20, 1904, reprint pp. 404-405: “Eshi Jingwen zhi kuozhang ci” [Some words on the expansion 
of Eshi Jingwen]. The articles are mostly not particularly marked or signed. 
43
 Ibid. p. 405. 
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 Shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904 the 
newspaper changed its name into Jingzhong Ribao (“alarm bell”) (ill. 5).44 Without 
being explicitly “anti-Russian” anymore, the new title underlined that a bigger threat 
than Russia45 was in fact that China, by all means, was going to end up as the true loser 
of that raging war.46 It was still believed that it was primarily Russian and not Japanese 
ambitions in Korea which caused the outbreak of the war. Correspondingly, depictions 
of imperialism were concentrated on the Russians while at the same time there was 
hardly any analysis of Japan’s self-interest. The Chinese neutrality, in turn, was said to 
only involve the factual loss of sovereignty over Manchuria.47 If sovereignty there was 
lost, it would be soon lost also for China as a whole. – This clearly shows that the main 
interest of this newspaper published in Shanghai had not been Manchuria per se. Rather, 
the editors perceived the case of Manchuria as the prelude to the loss of “core” China.48 
This was also the reason why the apathy of the Chinese people was regarded as so 
dangerous. A cartoon illustrates this in the following pictures (ill. 6): the Chinese are 
celebrating New Year (according to the Western calendar always in January/February 
and thus at the time of the outbreak of the war) while the Japanese and the Russians cut 
the melon (China); Germany and France (in tendency pro-Russian) and Great Britain 
and the US (in tendency pro-Japanese) observe the situation. The melon seeds are 
represented in the shape of little people. Russia is holding a slice of melon in her hand 
and Japan wants to get it. The whole picture is characterised as the irony of China’s 
“neutrality” (zhong li, lit.: to stand in the middle), which in reality was only a “fig leaf” 
for China’s impotence. This is also given as the reason why the human-shaped seeds are 
drawn so small 49  – a rare example of expressed sympathy with the population of 
Manchuria – the little human-shaped seeds. 
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 Cf. the announcement in Eshi Jingwen on February 20, 1904, reprint p. 404 and on February 23, 1904, 
reprint p. 437. 
45
 Reprint p. 404. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 This had been put in a similar way already in earlier Chinese revolutionary publications like 
Zhejiangchao (Tides of Zhejiang) which was released in Japan in 1903-04: Manchuria is only an omen 
for the rest of China! Cf. Lu Yan, Re-understanding Japan, Honolulu, 2004, p. 34. 
49
 Jingzhong Ribao, February 29, 1904, reprint pp. 40-41. 
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 In order to break through the official neutrality, an additional incentive was 
spread only a couple of days after the outbreak of the war – the prognosis that Japan 
would surely be the winner. The reasons were given as twofold: 1. contrary to Russia, in 
Japan the whole nation was supporting the war; 2. Japan had organised international 
support by securing an alliance with Great Britain and the good-will of the US, while 
Russia was standing all alone (which was actually not true). Had the Confucian sage 
Mencius not said: “The one who gets the most support will be followed by the whole 
world?50 – This shows, by the way, that every possible layer of argument was employed 
to convince the Chinese readership. – Furthermore, the Russians were said to be too 
self-confident and did not take the enemy seriously while the Japanese were very well 
prepared.51 Another cartoon (ill. 7) further emphasised the fact that the fearful Chinese 
actually allowed the Russians to bully them rather than to stand up to the Russians as 
the Japanese did. If the Chinese did so as well, the ostentatious Russians would give in 
very quickly (as one can see in the illustration).52  
 A further cartoon (ill. 8) to discredit Russia made clear that the Russians viewed 
Manchuria – here represented by a carrousel – only as a toy. In the song played while 
the carrousel is spinning, the Russians are even accused of having intervened as early as 
1895 (!) (Triple Intervention) – an astounding accusation from the Chinese point of 
view who had gained from it back then, but very understandable from a Japanese 
perspective, which suggests that the Japanese standpoint was taken over here without 
question.53 Further, a parallel was drawn between the events of the year 1895 and the 
present war in order to provide a prognosis of who would win: first of all the starting 
situation of both wars was deemed similar and just as the Qing lost the war back then, 
now the Russians would lose – again here equalling Qing-China and Russia. The 
implicit conclusion on which horse one should bet thus became very obvious to the 
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 Mengzi, 2B, chapter 1, sentence 4. 
51
 Eshi Jingwen no. 72, February 24, 1904, reprint pp. 444-445: “Eren dui Riben zhi sixiang” [How the 
Russians think about Japan]. 
52
 Eshi Jingwen no. 48, January 31, 1904, reprint p. 323. 
53
 Jingzhong Ribao, March 5, 1904, reprint Taipei 1983, pp. 90-91. 
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readership. The official neutrality, in turn, was mocked at with ironic illustrations of 
China trying to keep her balance on artillery shells ready to explode (ill. 9).54 
 Even if a lot of cartoons were de facto directly taken over from Japan (and at 
times uncritically adopted), this procedure was not always non-reflective, purely 
pragmatic and without any ulterior motives as some Chinese comments demonstrated. 
E.g., the comment to an adopted cartoon that represents Great Britain together with 
Japan (because of their alliance) as the adult guardians of little China and Korea, reveals 
the perceived disgrace of on the one hand China’s being put on an equal footing with 
Korea, and on the other of the humiliation by China’s (and Korea’s) being represented 
as children – since, as is argued, everybody knew that children do not have any rights. 
This critique, however, was not meant to be directed against the Japanese cartoonist but 
rather aimed at challenging the Chinese readership’s sense of pride.55 This shows that 
the newspaper deliberately availed itself of material from elsewhere but used it 
according to its own agenda. 
 The anti-Russian and anti-neutralist standpoint of the newspaper was propagated 
in various ways: e.g., it was mentioned that Polish people which had been treated so 
badly by the Russians, were fighting on the Japanese side now,56 or it was reported that 
Chinese bandits in Manchuria (in a way representatives of the otherwise apathetic 
people), incited by hatred for the “Cossacks”, collaborated with the Japanese. 57  
Furthermore, it was stressed that the Japanese were obviously much better informed 
about the developments in Manchuria than the Chinese themselves. “Why do we know 
less about our own territory than others?” – was the probing question.58 Russia, in turn, 
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 Ibid. March 7, 1904, reprint pp. 110-111. 
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 March 9, 1904, reprint p. 121. 
56
 March 9-11, 1904, reprint p. 128, p. 138 and p. 148: “Bolan zhishi zhi xi” [Announcement of the Polish 
“men of high purpose”]. (The term zhishi, Japanese: shishi, was a designation used, above all, for political 
activist in Japan during the late Edo and early Meiji period.) 
57
 March 14, 1904, reprint p. 175: “Manzhou mazei zhi jinkuang” [Current situation of bandits in 
Manchuria]. 
58
 March 17, 1904, reprint p. 211. 
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was accused also of other wrongdoings: e.g., the topic of persecution of Jews in Russia 
found its way into the foreign news section of the newspaper.59     
 The main target of criticism was, however, the “apathetic” Chinese people who 
relied on the government rather than to bethink themselves of their own strength.60 As a 
counterexample the attempt to establish a Taiwanese Republic was highly praised (in 
1895, in order to prevent the cession of Taiwan to Japan after the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki); this endeavour, however, had not received any support from the other 
Chinese provinces and thus was doomed to fail. This apathy, the implication goes, 
would surely lead to disaster again now. While China would not ally with Japan but still 
presumed that the Japanese would fight for them, the newspaper criticised the naïve 
Chinese people for hoping to fob off the Japanese with a few pennies in the future (ill. 
11).61 An in-depth analysis of what the Japanese could exactly demand of China for 
their “services”, however, was evaded. This demonstrates that the people behind the 
newspaper did not intend to warn about potential Japanese ambitions (which would 
have been contrary to the baseline of the newspaper) but were rather concerned with 
propagating political involvement amongst the readership, and lobbying for societal-
political participation opportunities (addressing the authorities). 
 Take-overs from Japanese newspapers therefore need to be seen in this light. 
Apart from cartoons, also other information on Russia was taken from Japanese 
newspapers, such as news on the “nihilists” and revolutionary activities in Russia in 
general.62 This perfectly fitted the political (revolutionary) orientation of the newspaper 
since its chance to achieve an abandonment of the policy of neutrality vanished over 
time anyway. 
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 May 14, 1904, pp. 790-791: “Lun Eren nüesha youtairen shi” [About the Jewish pogrom by the 
Russians]. 
60
 March 18, 1904, reprint pp. 214-215: “Zhongguo minzu sixiang zhi jinbu” [About the progress in the 
Chinese people’s thinking]. 
61
 Cf. the cartoon in the newspaper on March 21, 1904, reprint p. 251. Though the Russians are defeated 
and the Chinese people are happy about it, China’s status of neutrality still leads to her feeling intimidated 
by the Russians.  
62
 Examples are: reprint p. 278, p. 348, p. 364, p. 400, p. 459, p. 470, p. 490, p. 501, p. 510, p. 531, p. 541, 
p. 640, p. 650, p. 738. 
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 Correspondingly, the newspaper which was originally dedicated to issues 
concerning Russia, increasingly published political articles on China herself: topics such 
as the prospect for a constitutional system,63 (which had been demanded before 1904 
already; from 1904 onward it was pressed for even by provincial officials and publicly 
promoted), 64  the anti-Manchu movement, 65  or the question of authoritarianism in 
general were discussed.66 The newspaper propagated “revolution”.67 (One might remind 
here also the Subao-case, the first “press scandal” in Chinese history which went on in 
the background. This newspaper, published in the foreign concessions of Shanghai, was 
closed due to pro-revolutionary articles very critical of the Qing government; the 
authors had to go to prison in the end).68 Even basic elements such as the family system 
came under attack;69 the nature and the role of Confucianism70 and the Chinese class 
system 71  were also discussed – thus starting many debates in anticipation of later 
discussions at the time of May Fourth.72 This illustrates once again that the real thrust of 
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 For the first time on March 25, 1904, reprint p. 284: “Lun Zhongguo lixian wu wang yu shang” [One 
does not need to hope for the authorities for introducing a constitution in China]. Later, a whole series 
appeared on the issue (pp. 1518-1581, August 1904): “Zhongguo lixian wenti” [The problem of 
introducing a constitution in China]. 
64
 Cf. Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 186-192. In 1905 the court dispatched delegations to different countries in 
order to examine the constitutional issue which threatened to take the wind out of the revolutionaries’ 
sails. The latter thus tried to sabotage this, though in vain.    
65
 March 26, 1904, pp. 294-295: “Zonglun paiManpai zhi shixingjia” [Summary discussion of the 
activists of the anti-Manchu faction]. 
66
 March 27, 1904, pp. 304-305: “Lun qiangquan zhi shuo zhi fasheng” [On the origin of the theory of 
authoritarianism].  
67
 Cf. pp. 382-383 (April 2, 1904): “Shang gemingdang shu” [To the revolutionaries]. 
68
 The Subao, a newspaper published in Shanghai, was closed down in 1903 in consequence of calling for 
revolution and of disparaging remarks about the Manchus. Since it was published in the concession areas, 
its closure was considered to be legally problematic. As China's first "press freedom-scandal", the process 
caused a great stir. See J. Lust, “The Su-Pao Case: An Episode in the early Chinese Nationalist 
Movement” in: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. XXVII, 1964, pp. 408-429; 
Wang, Y. C.: “The Su-Pao Case: A Study of Foreign Pressure, Intellectual Fermentation, and Dynastic 
Decline,” Monumenta Serica Bd. XXIV, 1965, pp. 84-129.   
69
 April 13, 1904, reprint pp. 476-477: “Lun Zhongguo jiazu yazhi zhi yuanyin” [Reasons for the 
suppression system of the Chinese family clan]. 
70
 May 4, 1904, reprint pp. 688-689, as a counter argument that Confucianism should be blamed for 
everything: “Lun kongjiao yu Zhongguo zhengzhi wu she” [Confucianism has nothing to do with Chinese 
politics]. This debate was revived again later. 
71
 May 12, 1904, pp. 756-757: “Lun Zhongguo jieji zhidu” [On the Chinese class system].  
72
 The May Fourth Movement, in the narrow sense, intends a patriotic protest movement in China, first 
carried out by students, then by broader segments of the urban population, on the occasion of the 
negotiations on the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919, in which the former German rights over Shandong 
had not been returned to China but transferred to the Japanese. In a broader sense the May Fourth 
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this newspaper was much broader and more fundamental than just to spread anti-
Russian sentiments.                
 Once the first high-tide of Japanese successes receded in the course of the war, a 
few voices appeared doubting that Japan would be the clear winner, especially since the 
Russians were going to replace their chief commander of the ground forces, Alekseev, 
who was speculated to have been the main reason for all the defeats. 73 (Contrary to 
Japan, the navy which was definitely as important as the army in the war found not 
much interest in China. However, this evaluation has to be seen against the background 
of the respect Japanese publications paid to the new designated chief commander 
Kuropatkin who was going to replace Alekseev). In the context of these uncertainties, 
an early prognosis of the peace negotiations (the actual negotiations were no longer to 
be witnessed by the newspaper since it was to be banned in January 1905)74 ventured a 
fairly skeptical scenario for China, speculating that both warring factions would win at 
the end: i.e. even if the Russians lost Manchuria, they would still help themselves with 
Northwestern China and Mongolia.75 So the enthusiasm for Japan was substituted by the 
deep concern about China’s own prospects. 
 This even influenced the reporting on Russia. Reports on abuse of Chinese by 
Russians continued,76  and also, the Russians were still frequently accused of using 
Chinese neutrality for their own benefit. 77  But from that time on there were also 
occasionally positive reports about Russia – e.g. about the outstanding role of Russian 
women: whether as a revolutionary or as a helper in war (e.g. by medical service in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Movement is understood as an intellectual and cultural movement of renewal, which advocated a far-
reaching break with tradition and the takeover of “modern” foreign ideas. 
73
 April 3, 1904, pp. 344-345: “RiE jie sheng lun” [Russia and Japan will both win]. 
74
 The newspaper appeared until January 28, 1905. It is said to have been banned because of German 
protests against an article on intrigues in Shandong and because of its reporting on the high-ranking 
Manchu Tieliang – not because of reporting on the war per se.  
75
 April 9, 1904, pp. 436-437: “RiE zhanhou lieguo huiyi zhi yuyan” [Forecast of the conference of the 
allied countries after the end of the Russo-Japanese War]. 
76
 E.g. April 9, 1904, p. 438: “Eren zhi baoxing” [The cruelties of the Russians]. 
77
 April 12, 1904, pp. 466-467: “Lun eren yi pohuai Zhongguo zhi zhongli wei li” [On the advantage that 
Russians take from the violation of Chinese neutrality]. 
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army). This implied that at least the Russian women could serve as a model in China 
because of their social awareness.78        
 The overall argumentation, however, shifted increasingly away from the warring 
factions towards the question of the impact of the war on China: if the world was 
shaken by Japan which – despite the take-over of military responsibilities by 
Kuropatkin – nonetheless scored further victories in the war, China certainly would 
have to pay for it in the aftermath. And Russia – if not by a victory in the war – was at 
least going to make history through revolution(!).79 – This latter prophetic, and for 
China shameful estimation shows that, on the one hand, the newspaper wanted to shift 
its attention more and more to the propagation of revolutionary ideas; on the other, it 
also demonstrates that even Russia, which generally served as a negative reflection of 
China's own situation, was considered to be capable of renewal; thus China was in 
danger to be left staying behind alone and remain completely disconnected from the 
train of world history moving ahead.  
 Accordingly, and in correspondence to the revolutionary orientation of the 
newspaper, autocracy was cited as one of the main reasons for the Russian defeats in the 
war; the war in this respect was interpreted as a contest of systems: “In an autocratic 
country there are only slaves and no citizens […]. When an autocratic country confronts 
another one, victory and defeat are decided by the strength or weakness of the 
respective master alone. The slaves are entirely dependent on him and are only used in 
order to carry out this spectacle. This is exactly the case with Russia and China […]. 
But when an autocratic country confronts a country with a constitution, the autocratic 
one will surely lose. This is the case with Russia and Japan.”80 The Russians, it is 
argued, knew very well that their system would not be able to survive very long in the 
twentieth century, but similar cases should see this as a warning (a dig at the 
Manchus).81      
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 April 13, 1904, p. 475: “Eguo furen zhi congjun” [The Russian women’s participation in war]. 
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 May 6, 1904, pp. 704-705: “Zhongguo qiantu” [The future of China]. 
80
 May 14, 1904, pp. 785-786: “Lun eren zhibai zhi you jiqi jiujing” [Why the Russians are going to lose 
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3.2.2. Reformist press commentaries 
A somewhat different nuance was brought into the discussion by the reformist journal 
Xinmin Congbao (New citizen) published in Japan (ill. 12). 82  Produced by the 
prominent refugee of the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, Liang Qichao, this journal 
again relied heavily on Japanese press reports. Liang, however, followed also Japan’s 
domestic discussions closely and realised clearly that Japan barely had the intention to 
pull the chestnuts out of the fire for China. He rather warned against the illusion of 
Japan having no ambitions in China. He kept the situation in perspective and at the 
outbreak of the war he outlined the war aims discussed in the Japanese press, namely 
the domination over Korea and at least the recovery of Manchuria which the Japanese 
regarded as their prey of the Sino-Japanese War lost in consequence of the Triple 
Intervention. Nonetheless, Liang saw the war as a struggle between the “races” and thus 
indirectly favoured Japan.83 To him, a look into the Japanese press clearly showed that 
Japan actually did not want China to be her ally at all, as an alliance would have meant 
that she would not be able to continue availing herself in China anymore. China was too 
weak anyway and would rather be a burden than of any help. And the Chinese two-
facedness and fickleness, he continued, were well known on the international stage 
already.84 In this respect, the idea of giving up neutrality was pointless. Despite some 
sympathy for Japan, Liang initially also warned against overestimating Japan’s 
capability; due to his Japanese surroundings, Liang, compared to his revolutionary 
compatriots of the Jingzhong Ribao, was more aware of the fact that Japan had to “put 
all her eggs in one basket” in the war and was restricted in her resources.85 Liang thus 
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 Usually, the journal was published fortnightly from 1902-1907, but in the relevant years, it appeared 
fairly irregularly; hence the dating of the issues can be only estimated at, inferring from some internal 
hints in the issues.    
83
 See “Riben Sheng Ze Heru” [What if Japan would win?], in Xinmen Congbao no. 40/41 (after mid-
February 1904), 117-118. 
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 “Riben hegu yu Zhongguo zhi zhongli hu” [Why does Japan want China’s neutrality?], ibid. pp. 122-
123. Here, Liang referred to a cartoon which presents a Chinaman waving with a flag in hand, inscribed 
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Gotelind Müller: Chinese perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War 
 
24 
 
feared that in case of a Japanese defeat, East Asia as a whole would be “erased”.86 On 
the other hand, he also warned that even if Russia was driven out of Korea and 
Manchuria, Japan would merely and simply replace Russia. This could be substantiated 
later via statements of influential Japanese in Liang’s journal. 87  With a mix of 
admiration and horror he acknowledged – like the Jingzhong Ribao – that the war was 
encountered with much more public approval in Japan than in Russia since no 
opposition at all piped up in Japan (which actually is not quite true).88 The Chinese 
perception of the war, however, did not appear reasonable to him: in his point of view, 
the Chinese, in a naïve way, only cared about victory or defeat rather than being 
concerned with the question of what the war was actually fought for.89     
 Another characteristic was that Liang, the reformer, was also interested in 
practical and material aspects of the war, i.e. unlike the Jingzhong Ribao, he was not 
primarily concerned about agitation. Such being the case, the reader found explanations 
and sketches of new weapons that were used in the war. These weapons were also 
deemed of interest for a modern national defence in China in the future (ill. 13).90 
Another topic dealt with was China’s position on the international stage from a juridical 
point of view.91 After all, the Chinese government was advised in Liang’s journal to 
                                                                                                                                                            
Japanese side. Though Japan had tried to evaluate carefully her chances before the declaration of war, she 
de facto had to make huge sacrifices for the war and was dependent on foreign capital. In contrast, Russia 
was in fact in possession of reserves but was not able to mobilise them. For further information on the 
Japanese warfare’s dependency on foreign capital, see: John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-
Japanese War, Princeton, 1964, pp. 167-169. The question whether the Russians would have been able to 
turn the tide in their favour if the war had continued (as was “loser” Kuropatkin’s contention in his 
justifications of warfare) is controversial in scholarship down to the present day. Cf. General Kuropatkin, 
The Russian Army and the Japanese War. 2 vols., London, 1909. 
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 “RiE zhangzheng zhi jianglai”, ibid.  
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 See ibid, and Zhou Boxun, “Jinhou zhi Manzhou” [Future Manchuria], in Xinmin Congbao, year 3, no. 
17 (no. 65 in total counting) (ca. beginning of the year 1905), pp. 21-41; continued in no. 18, pp. 11-32 
and no. 19, pp. 1-13.  
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 “RiE zhanzheng zhi gan” [Thoughts on the Russo-Japanese War], in Xinmin Congbao no. 46-48 (ca. 
spring to mid 1904), p. 33. 
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 Cf. “Junjianxue dalüe” [Outline of a study on warships], a translated Japanese lecture manuscript, in 
Xinmin Congbao no. 46-48, (ca. spring to mid 1904), pp. 235-258. 
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 “RiE zhanyi guanyu guojifa shang Zhongguo zhi diwei ji gezhong wenti” [The Russo-Japanese battle 
and China’s position in international law, as well as other relevant issues], in Xinmin Congbao, year 3, no. 
2 (no. 50 in total counting), (ca. mid 1904), pp. 29-40. 
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claim reparations after the war for damages caused to the people of Manchuria.92 – This 
claim, however, did not arise out of sheer philanthropy but was merely considered a part 
of diplomatic tactics to finally draw also benefits for China from international law.  
 Apart from that the Xinmin Congbao also published press commentaries from 
the West and from China and provided background information on Russia, such as a 
biography of the tsar or reports on revolutionary activities. This, by the way, 
demonstrates that it was common practice in Chinese publications of that time to take 
over articles from elsewhere. The Russian 1905 Revolution, which could not be 
commented on anymore in the Jingzhong Ribao since the newspaper had been already 
banned,93 was evaluated by Liang as a necessity in a country such as Russia; to him, it 
was caused by inequalities that resulted from differences in class, religion and ethnicity. 
By characterising Russia as the “only” autocratic state, he implied a clear distinction 
between Russia and China, which means that China must not necessarily also go 
through a revolution.94  He emphasised that it was exactly Nicholas II’s attitude of 
refusal of constitutional wishes that made for revolution being the ultima ratio95 – by 
which explanation he not only made his own political option of a constitutional 
monarchy in China plausible to the readership, but also gave a clear broad hint to the 
government to be clever enough to accept it.  
 When the end of the war was approaching, Liang warned against great 
expectations that reclaiming full sovereignty over Manchuria would be possible; he 
rather pleaded for the strategy of turning her into a permanent neutral zone.96 This, 
however, was not to happen. Thus he presented the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in a fairly 
objective manner but with some weariness to his readership. He also mentioned the 
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 Zhou Boxun, “Jinhou zhi Manzhou,” in Xinmin Congbao, year 3, no. 19 (no. 67 in total counting), (ca. 
mid 1905), pp. 4-5. 
93
 Cf. Liang’s comment “Wenziyu yu wenmingguo” [Censorship and civilised nation], in Xinmin 
Congbao, year 3, no. 15 (no. 63 in total counting), (ca. beginning of the year 1905), pp. 90-92.  
94
 Liang, “Eluosi geming zhi yingxiang” [The influence of the Russian Revolution], in Xinmin Congbao, 
year 3, no. 13 (no. 61 in total counting), (ca. beginning of the year 1905), pp. 25-26. 
95
 Liang, “Ziyou hu? Si hu?” [Freedom or death?], in Xinmin Congbao, year 3, No. 13 (no. 61 in total 
counting), (ca. beginning of the year 1905), p. 37. 
96
 Liang, “Ping zhengfu duiyu RiE heyi zhi judong” [Criticism of the actions taken by the government 
with regard to the Russo-Japanese peace], in Xinmin Congbao, year 3, no. 20 (no. 68 in total counting), 
(ca. midyear 1905), pp. 31-35. 
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turmoil in Japan in consequence of the disappointment over the bad conditions that 
resulted under American pressure in the negotiations; but he did not connect his report 
to the question of race. In contrast to the time of the outbreak of the war, the question of 
commonalities with Japan did not appear expedient any longer.97 Regarding the treaty, 
his conclusion for China was that Manchuria was simply split up now between the 
combatants into two spheres of interest.98 In view of the actual power relations, he did 
not share the relief the Chinese government articulated, to whom the Chinese 
sovereignty appeared as at least preserved on paper. In Liang’s opinion China could not 
expect anything from anyone anyway.     
  
3.2.3. Liberal-bourgeois press commentaries 
The liberal-bourgeois press will be represented here by the influential journal Dongfang 
Zazhi (Eastern Miscellany) (ill. 14), founded in Shanghai in March 1904 (i.e. 
immediately after the outbreak of the war), which understood itself as a kind of 
synthesis of other publications, modelling itself after the Japanese Taiyô (sun).99 The 
Dongfang Zazhi thus regularly took over material from other publications – even more 
so than the other above mentioned examples. Its perspective was also different in terms 
of its frequency of appearance: while the revolutionary Eshi Jingwen (later: Jingzhong 
Ribao) was a daily newspaper, and Liang’s Xinmin Congbao appeared fortnightly, the 
Donfang Zazhi was a monthly and, correspondingly, maintained a greater distance to 
daily events. 100  The analysis of these three publications thus provides also an 
understanding of the events of the war through a difference in zooming. Though the 
Dongfang Zazhi, as well, was politically stamped by its editorial team, nevertheless a 
plurality of voices came through, due to its “eclectic” character of reprinting articles 
from various other journals.  
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 Liang, “RiE heyi jishi benmo” [The course of the peace negotiations between Japan and Russia],  in 
Xinmin Congbao, year 3, no. 21 (no. 69 in total counting), (autumn 1905), pp. 80-94. 
98
 Ibid. p. 94. 
99
 March 1904, no. 1, editorial. The journal has been accessed on microfilm.  
100
 This is not to deny that the Dongfang Zazhi published also detailed information like chronologies of 
the course of the war.  
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 A good example in this regard is its second issue of April 1904. Concerning the 
wide-spread anti-Russian sentiments in China, two articles that were taken over from 
outside warned that Japan would have no real chance in the war and that the other 
powers were only mimicking neutrality; in reality, however, they perceived the Russo-
Japanese war as a battle against the “yellow race”, in which they would never allow the 
“yellow peril”, i.e. here the Japanese, to triumph.101 In that way voices arguing against 
pro-Japanese and anti-neutralist sentiments were presented in the journal.  
 The magazine itself, however, often displayed an astounding, one might even 
say naïve, trust in Japan. In the same issue that printed the named warning against blind 
faith in Japan, the editors of Dongfang Zazhi argued that a Japanese victory would cause 
changes in Russia which would eventually lead to a Russian reduction of arms. This, in 
turn, would be followed by a reduction of arms of the other powers. Hence, China 
would be able to continue its reform policy and finally, an end would be put to all 
discussions about the splitting-up of China, since no one would then be in need of 
troops any longer. “The Russo-Japanese War is an omen for all this!”102 A Japanese 
victory as the root for global pacifism! All current information about an alleged Russian 
superiority was said, in turn, to be spread by the Russians themselves only in order to 
intimidate the Chinese.103 
 With regard to the evaluation of the war as being a war of “races”, many articles, 
however, agreed with the Japan-sceptics.104 It was also articulated more consciously that, 
in case of a Japanese victory, this war would have great influence on the whole region 
and the world, in fact. It would not only prove that the “yellow race” was not per se 
inferior but also that the political model of autocracy must be relinquished in the 
future.105 Moreover, with a certain degree of pride, it was stressed that outstanding 
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 Guxing (pseudonym), “Manzhou shan houce” [A good future policy for Manchuria], no. 2, April 1904, 
pp. 1-9; “Lun huanghuo” [On the “yellow peril”], (taken over from the Zhongwai Ribao), ibid. pp. 14-16. 
102
 “Lun huanghuo”, p. 16, April 1904. 
103
 “Tun bing shou jing” [Stationing troops and defending territory], no. 2, April 1904, p. 127. In this 
article the Russians were also accused of “having bought” the Beijing and Tientsin Times for making 
propaganda for them.  
104
 Chuping (pseudonym). “Lun zhengfu bu ke ziqi” [The government must not give up on itself], no. 3, 
May 1904, p. 4. 
105
 “Lun Zhongguo qiantu you ke wang zhi ji” [There is reason for hope for China’s future] (taken over 
from Zhongwai Ribao), no. 3, May 1904, p. 14. 
Gotelind Müller: Chinese perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War 
 
28 
 
Japanese war heroes such as admiral Tôgô drew their inner and outer strength from 
ancient Chinese learning and martial arts.106 Unlike the Jingzhong Ribao, the sympathy 
for Japan in the Dongfang Zazhi could not even be temporarily questioned by the 
nomination of a Kuropatkin. On the contrary, after Japan’s victories on the ground in 
Manchuria, the Chinese government was accused of applying double standards when it 
sent out independent Qing officials to Manchuria only now after the Japanese had 
finally gained dominion in that area!107 There was no trust in China’s own diplomacy 
anyway; rather it was believed that it might be even better for China to not attend the 
peace settlement at all!108  
 As a liberal-bourgeois newspaper, the Dongfang Zazhi was reform-oriented, too, 
and praised the Japanese case of westernisation while keeping one’s own identity. China 
should follow this example. Did not Itô Hirobumi, the outstanding Japanese statesman 
and Wu Tingfang, the Qing-diplomat, go to school together in the West? While Itô was 
rapidly making a steep career after his return, Wu had to climb up the greasy pole in 
China. It was small wonder that China did not achieve anything as long as she treated 
her elite that way.109    
 Politically, the Dongfang Zazhi did not directly agitate against China’s policy of 
neutrality; rather, in the course of the war the paper warned of a possible 
internationalisation of the conflict, which would be facilitated by an abandonment of 
China’s neutrality. With their back to the wall, it was precisely this internationalisation 
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 Cf. Maizhao (pseudonym), “Lun Zhongguo you jiubi qishuai zhi xuepai” [China has traditional 
teachings which could save us], no. 4, June 1904, in the column “Sheshuo” pp. 61-62 (from this issue 
onwards, the pages of each issue were not continuously counted anymore; instead pages were counted 
within columns across issues). In particular, Wang Yangming’s teachings and Jûdô (which was originally 
Chinese) are mentioned.  
107
 “Zhengfu ni she dongsansheng zongdu zhi fei shi” [This is the wrong timing for establishing a 
governorship in the three Eastern provinces by the government], no. 7, September 1904), in column 
“Shiping” p. 39. 
108
 “Wairen qingwu Zhongguo duo you Zhongguo zizhao shuo” [That foreigners are looking down on 
China is mainly self-inflicted] (taken over from the Dagongbao), no. 8, October 1904, in column 
“Sheshuo” p. 162. The idea at times was also that if only the combatants negotiated, an 
internationalisation to the detriment of China might be avoided. See “Lun Zhongguo yi she fa wu shi 
lieqiang ganshe yuandong” [China should be trying to avoid the interference of the allied powers in East 
Asia], no. 6, August 1904, in column “Sheshuo” p. 124.      
109
 “Lun Zhongguo yu riben ouhua sulü zhi bili” [Comparison of the speed of Europeanisation between 
Japan and China], no. 10, December 1904, in column “Sheshuo” p. 251. 
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that the Russians were increasingly working towards.110 Thus, there was the awareness 
that this could have serious consequences not only for China but far beyond that (if one 
just thinks of the thesis that the Russo-Japanese War was the precursor of the First 
World War).111  
 When the end of the war was approaching, the Dongfang Zazhi prophesied the 
much longed-for systemic change in China towards constitutionalism as Japan’s victory 
had destroyed its last counter evidence – Russia.112 From this one can conclude that the 
primary reason for the consistent sympathy for Japan in the magazine lay in the fact that 
it aimed at setting into motion a process of political participation, which was mostly 
favoured by the liberal middle class predominantly living in Shanghai. 113 
Correspondingly, the reasons for Japan’s victory were seen in more profound factors 
rather than wealth and strength – the two factors hitherto dominant in the official 
Chinese reform discourse. Therefore, the whole Chinese society needed to be turned 
upside down and had to be actively included, and it was hoped that Japan would support 
this out of “Asian” solidarity.114 Manchuria’s fate was also here seen as an omen for the 
imminent fate of China as a whole.115   
 
4. The Manchurian Perspective       
The Manchurian perspective is unfortunately the most difficult to capture since a 
thorough acquisition of data in Manchuria herself did not start until 1906, i.e. by the 
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 “Bian wang pian” [Analysis of perishing], no. 12, January 1905, in column “Sheshuo” p. 284. The 
magazine, which was originally released on the first day of each month, changed its publication date to 
the last day of each month in December 1904; thus two issues were published in December and issue no. 
12 was released on January 31.  
111
 Cf. John W. Steinberg et. al., ed., The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero, 
Leiden, 2005. 
112
 “Lun Ri sheng wei xianzheng zhi zhao” [Japan’s victory is an omen for a constitutional policy]. 
113
 Cf. “Lun lixian wei wanshi genben” [The introduction of a constitution is the basis for everything] 
(taken over from the Nanfangbao), year 2, no. 10, November 1905, column “neiwu” p. 171.  
114
 “Riben wanwo dongya quanbu zhi baquan” [Japan takes up the hegemony over the whole of East 
Asia], year 2, no. 9, October 1905, in column “Sheshuo” pp. 179-183. Since this article had originally 
appeared in the Fujian Riri Xinwen, this per se suggests a pro-Japanese standpoint in tendency as Fujian 
was a Japanese sphere of influence.  
115
 “Lun zhengfu yi jieli yuanzhu waijiaoguan” [The government should help the diplomats with all its 
might], year 2, no. 8, September 1905, column “waijiao” p. 66.  
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Japanese in the wake of the war.116 Further, a differentiated look should ideally be taken 
at the possibly different impacts of the war on ethnic Manchurians and on Han Chinese, 
or on the different regions in Manchuria, since the term “Manchuria” as a unit in fact 
represents the view on it from outside.117 E.g., northern and southern Manchuria were 
markedly different.118 
 Up to the war, Manchuria had held a special status in China.119 Since it was the 
ancestral homeland of the governing Manchu dynasty which was very concerned about 
maintaining its own identity while adopting many aspects of Chinese culture, and since 
many of the most important ancestral graves of the Qing were situated there, 120 
Manchuria was not regarded as a “normal” part of China. According to the will of the 
Qing rulers, Manchuria was to be protected from massive immigration of Han Chinese; 
despite all segregation efforts this could not be prevented, though. However, also the 
Han Chinese perceived Manchuria as somehow “different”, the region “outside the 
pass” (i.e. beyond the Chinese Wall), and the people settling there were seen as some 
kind of “pioneers”. As a consequence of Russian encroachment via the so-called 
“railway imperialism” in the course of the 19th century, however, Han Chinese 
settlement was eventually even encouraged by the government in Beijing.  
 An in-depth account on what the war which was raging on Manchurian soil from 
the end of April 1904 onward meant to the local population, is difficult to give with the 
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 Data and estimates from the time before vary to such a great extent that it would be problematic to 
draw conclusions about the number of casualties caused by the war by a comparison with the more 
accurate Japanese data collections from 1906 onward. One estimated number is 20,000 victims. See 
Rosemary Quested, cited in David Wolff, “Intelligence Intermediaries: The Competition for Chinese 
Spies,” in Steinberg et al. (eds.) op. cit., pp. 305-330. There p. 306.  
117
 In Chinese the area concerned was at the time always called dong san sheng [the three eastern 
provinces].  
118
 Northern Manchuria had the most intensive contact with Russia; it was more sparsely populated by 
Han Chinese and of low population density in general. Neither during the Sino-Japanese War nor during 
the Russo-Japanese War was it involved to the same degree as Southern Manchuria into war-related 
events and its consequences (e.g. with cession of territory).   
119
 On this, see Robert H. G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ch’ing History, Cambridge, Mass., 1970. 
120
 Against the earlier dominant trend in Chinese Studies to concentrate on the “sinified” side of the 
Manchus, an opposite trend developed in the 1980s which affirmed a Manchu identity (esp. Evelyn 
Rawski and Pamela Crossley). By the way, it was negotiated that the ancestral graves would be explicitly 
protected from damage by acts of war. 
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material available. Rather, only a few spotlights can be given.121 E.g., one can see from 
Chinese newspaper reports that the responsible daotai (an official) in Fengtian 
(Mukden/Shenyang) tried to find out from the warring factions where the next battle 
was planned to be fought in order to evacuate the affected population in time. Also, it 
seems that at least the authorities and private individuals in the cities took care of 
refugees. 122  Western observers of the war on either the Japanese or Russian side 
remained mostly mute about the local residents. They were rather interested in the 
course of the war or in its military aspects and lived with the troops of the respective 
side. Only scattered remarks exist, such as in Sir Jan Hamilton’s and Brooke’s accounts 
who both followed the happenings of the war as British war observers on the Japanese 
and the Russian side respectively. According to Hamilton, Manchuria (in contrast to 
Korea) was a prosperous area with flourishing agriculture and trade. 123 After the 
combatants had quit the field, the Chinese would plough furrows in the devastated areas 
in such a breathtaking speed that very soon the traces of war would disappear.124 In his 
accounts, life of the people appeared – despite war – largely unaffected, apart from the 
unlucky villages that were situated in the firing line and whose inhabitants thus fled to 
the cities, as Brooke states who portrays the Chinese as rather curious about the 
spectacle of war and only satisfied when some bomb impacted on their 
neighbourhoods.125 One might wonder how realistic these accounts were since the idea 
of an “aseptic” war without any collateral damages (or even with an “event-like” 
character) has remained an illusion to this day.  
 But for the revolutionary press, which every now and then mentioned the 
sufferings of the “neutral” population, and occasional expressions of sympathy in the 
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 In the course of his long-term expertise in the war and the reprint series of Western sources that were 
supervised by him, Nish collected a number of references and evidences. In addition, Nish also looked 
through Japanese material. See Nish’s “China and the Russo-Japanese War“. 
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 Cf. Lord Brooke, An Eye-witness in Manchuria, London, 1905, pp. 232-233, p. 251. 
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 See Sir Ian Hamilton, Tagebuch eines Generalstabsoffiziers während des russisch-japanischen 
Krieges [A staff officer's scrap-book during the Russo-Japanese War], Berlin, 1910, p. 45. 
124
 Ibid. p. 137. 
125
 E.g., Brooke, p. 99, p. 232, p. 141. On the last referred-to page he described the rural Chinese as 
childish curious onlookers that did not care about their own safety or their property for the sake of 
enjoying the spectacle. 
Gotelind Müller: Chinese perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War 
 
32 
 
reform press situated in Japan,126 inner-Chinese publications did not really seem to be 
interested in the locals but only in national goals (such as constitution, sovereignty, 
national pride etc). The often quoted affected “compatriots” seemed to be a mere 
rhetorical phrase. Local war reporting that either interviewed refugees or built up 
sympathy for them did not exist anyway. That is why, as noted, so much information 
was taken over from abroad – mainly from Japan.127 Even after the war, people who had 
been wounded as “neutral people”, or had lost their loved ones or whose house and farm 
had been destroyed could not demand any reparation.128 The only form in which the 
locals were mentioned more often was the endemic banditry there.129 As local power 
holders, they preferably sided with the group which would grant them most benefit 
(apparently most often the Japanese side).130 (This, in turn, put the Chinese government 
on the spot as it had to guarantee neutrality). It was quite obvious that Chinese were 
hired to serve as auxiliaries or to carry on espionage for one of the two sides.131 This of 
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 Liang Qichao, e.g., emphasised that the policy of neutrality was most advantageous for the population 
of Manchuria; for China as a whole, however, it was rather ambivalent. See his “Du ‘Jinhou zhi 
Manzhou’ shu hou” [Reaction to the reading of ‘Future Manchuria’], in Xinmin Congbao, year 3, no. 20, 
pp. 10-11. 
127
 It is at least mentioned nowhere that Chinese reporters took care of gathering information in war zones 
while Westerners and Japanese were mentioned as correspondents. Chinese newspapers used to recruit 
permanent correspondents only in larger cities or to inform about other parts of the country by publishing 
articles that had been sent in from outside rather than having any “travelling reporters”. Cf. Vittinghoff, 
op. cit., p. 146. The Russian combatants, on the other hand, apparently (according to Brooke) learnt about 
the war situation only via newspapers released in China. Inner-Russian information channels were 
chronically inoperative (an argument that was also used by Kuropatkin for explaining his failure).  
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 This demand was rejected by the Japanese during the Treaty of Beijing at the end of the year 1905. Cf. 
Nish, “China and the Russo-Japanese War”, p. 11. 
129
 For a characterisation of the latter, see Owen Lattimore, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (New York, 
1932), pp. 224-235. 
130
 A classic example of a biography resulting from this constellation is the warlord Zhang Zuolin. He 
was an ex-bandit and became a powerful warlord in Manchuria supported by the Japanese. By the time he 
became too independent according to the Japanese, they blew him up in a train. – Besides, the Russians 
did not seem to be that unpopular in Manchuria herself (see below); thus, collaboration with them existed, 
too. 
131
 Cf. Brooke, p. 55, who suggests that the Russians themselves very often did not know whether the 
suspects of espionage were Chinese or undercover Japanese. By reference to mainly Russian material, 
David Wolff has recently examined Russian and Japanese efforts to recruit Chinese spies. (Wolff, op. cit.). 
A further interesting source is the report of a French Secret Service Officer who suggested that the 
Chinese were recruited more successfully by the Japanese who went about it more systematically and 
used intimidation as well as good pay. Picard, “Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War: The Intelligence 
Department” [translated into English by the British Secret Service in India]. This was originally published 
in January 1905 in the Journal des Sciences Militaires, India Office Library and Records, British Library, 
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course again involved the matter of “neutrality”. There are reports, however, that at least 
for the coolie jobs the Japanese usually did not employ Chinese labourers (with the 
undertone that they would rather trust in their own people)132 while the Russians did 
(with the undertone that the Russians preferably shifted “dirty work” to “inferior races”). 
From the perspective of the locals, who were partly prevented by the war to pursue their 
“normal” occupations, these jobs were simply opportunities to earn some money. It 
seems, though, that the anyway numerous migrant workers from Shandong were 
preferably employed for coolie jobs rather than natives. 133  To which extent inner-
Chinese competition for job opportunities played a role here is only a matter of 
conjecture, based on scattered remarks.134 In contrast to the anti-Russian sentiments 
prevalent in the rest of China, the population of Manchuria did not seem to have 
uniformly shared this opinion. After all, the traces and memories of the Sino-Japanese 
War that had also been fought in Manchuria were still tangible here while the 
relationship with Russians had been mostly peaceful over a considerable time and the 
Manchurians had come to terms with them.135  
  
                                                                                                                                                            
Section “Military Department”, Sig.: L/MIL/17/20/22. (I thank Gita Dharampal-Frick for a copy of this 
report).     
132
 This, at least, is stated by Hamilton, p. 135. He admits elsewhere that the Japanese did not appreciate 
the Chinese very much and regarded themselves as entirely different (p. 357). This actually proved the 
question of the “common yellow race” as an illusion. Nish (p. 6), on the basis of Warners’ and Brook’s 
works, presents this completely different.  
133
 By the way, it is interesting to note that during the recruitment of Chinese labourers in the First World 
War by the English and French, Shandong men were also the most frequently hired. Shandong’s 
geographic position was logistically convenient since it was situated “opposite” the Liaodong Peninsula, 
the province was poor and had a high unemployment rate. Further, according to materials from the First 
World War, Shandong men were considered to be strong and healthy. In addition to that, Shandong men 
were already employed during the construction of the Russian railway in Manchuria, and also solidarised 
themselves with the Boxer Movement, which was particularly active in Shandong province. – Lattimore 
shows that the connection of Manchuria with Shandong has very ancient roots. Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 
197-208.       
134
 E.g., dock workers from the Southern Chinese city of Ningbo were sometimes negatively mentioned 
since they offered themselves for jobs in Manchuria during the war.    
135
 This was also confirmed by the Japanese who reacted in surprise that the Manchurians did not applaud 
their invasion as an act of “liberation” (cf. Nish p. 7). Also Hosie, who had worked in the British 
Consulate in Niuzhuang until 1900, stated that the Sino-Japanese War had remained unforgotten in 
Manchuria and was all present by the graves and remaining war positions. Alexander Hosie, Manchuria, 
its People, Resources and Recent History, New York and London, 1980 [1904], p. 6, pp. 39-41. 
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5. Effects   
The war had impacted upon China in a variety of ways. Seen from the aspect of foreign 
policy, China could officially retain her sovereignty over Manchuria by the Peace 
Treaty of Portsmouth. This had been an important goal of the Chinese government. 
However, this maintenance could not be ascribed to the abilities of Chinese diplomats; 
one might rather say that China had just been “lucky”: though she had been directly 
affected by the war, to her own disgrace she was not even asked to join the 
negotiations.136 Although all sides had demanded of China to remain neutral, this de 
facto had only consolidated her reputation as being incapable anyway. China had 
ultimately lost her role as a subject of world history and further on lived, visibly, as the 
object of others on the international stage. Viewed in this light, this time the Chinese 
had even fallen below the level of the Boxer Protocol which is usually seen as the nadir 
of China’s international status.137 There, the Chinese had been at least allowed to sign. 
Now, China’s government was mainly perceived as a “trustee in bankruptcy”. 
 As far as domestic policy was concerned, the war as well as Japan’s victory 
proved that China, which had been seen by critics as well as by the government as a 
synonym of Russia, had to follow the Japanese way: reforms were necessary. Even the 
court realised that – though half-heartedly. Further, reformers and revolutionaries finally 
drifted apart: while the reformers were hoping for cooperation with the government that 
supposedly had “woken up” now, and were hoping for a revolution “from above” with 
Japan in mind, for the revolutionaries it was more than clear that with the existing 
government there was no way to future. They, however, did not orient themselves so 
much towards the Japanese model but rather towards the temporary results in Russia: 
the Revolution of 1905 there seemed to prove that only pressure from below could stop 
autocracy. Even after it had become evident that the Russian 1905 Revolution would 
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 China had initially tried to join the negotiations but no one supported her intention. Rather, the 
Americans suggested she should withdraw.    
137
 It is worth noting that Japan made a separate treaty with China over Manchuria in December 1905 in 
which she obtained rights that had been denied to her in the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth directly from 
China. Cf. John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Princeton, 1964, pp. 334-343.  
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fail, it still inspired the Chinese revolutionaries to actively fight against the Manchus,138 
who had not even been able to defend their own homeland. Thus, the only apparent 
paradox emerged that the reformers, who had warned against one-sided trust in the 
Japanese during the war, now propagated the Japanese model, whereas the 
revolutionaries, who had been “pro-Japan” and anti-Russia during the war, now 
suggested Russia as the role model. The fundamental motives here in any case had 
never been “sympathy” for one or the other country but one’s own political interests. 
 For Manchuria, first and foremost, her special status changed. After the war, her 
status as a special zone within the Qing Empire faded, Manchuria was integrated into 
the ordinary province system and finally became a “normal” part of China (as which she 
is still – or again – regarded today). Nonetheless, Japan had asserted by her victory in 
the war and her takeover of the Liaodong Peninsula, her claim to Manchuria. Japan 
started to develop and investigate into Manchuria139 and laid the foundation for military 
dominance in an increasingly “Japanese Manchuria” 140  up to the establishment of 
Manshûkoku/ Manzhouguo in the 1930s . 
 The war, however, also triggered a rethinking amongst many Chinese 
intellectuals – and not only amongst revolutionaries such as Sun Yatsen, who hailed the 
Japanese victory, believing it would point to Asia the way ahead.141 Examples here 
include the famous case of Lu Xun, one of the most prominent Chinese writers of the 
20th century: almost two decades after the Russo-Japanese War, he recalled the time of 
war during which he was a medical student in Sendai in Northern Japan. He wrote that 
once after a lecture, he and his Japanese classmates were shown several slides of the 
war to which his classmates reacted enthusiastically. When a slide of the execution of a 
Chinese accused of espionage for the Russians by Japanese soldiers was shown, his 
classmates applauded. Lu Xun was not only shocked as a “compatriot” of the victim but, 
above all, because of the apathetic facial expression of the Chinese people on the slide 
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 Thus, in the late summer of 1905, Sun Yatsen’s “Tongmenghui” (Revolutionary Alliance) was 
founded in Tôkyô which intensively discussed the Russian revolution in its publication organ Minbao 
[The People].  
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 One only has to think of the much cited Mantetsu [Manchurian railway] materials.   
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 Cf. the title of Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka’s study: The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2001.  
141
 See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yatsen, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 211. 
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that were standing around the victim. 142  His classmates’ contempt of him, the 
“incapable Chinese”,143 and the apathy amongst Chinese had, he wrote, spurred him to 
give up his medical studies and to put pen to paper. This was the only way he could 
hope to effectively heal the Chinese people.144 – Although this account is only literary 
and cannot be taken at face value 1:1, it nonetheless retrospectively reflects in an 
individual way the basic dilemma of being officially non-involved but still directly 
affected: just as China during the Russo-Japanese War. 
 The fact that the question of apathy remained a concern for Lu Xun even after 
two decades was indeed symptomatic. However, it should also be highlighted and 
reminded that Russia’s breach of contract in 1903 prior to the war had in fact caused a 
societal reaction in China: for the first time, in parts of society political movements 
sprang up and the adequacy of Chinese governance was debated controversially in 
public.  This at least initiated the beginning of the end of Chinese apathy.  
 This leaves us with the last and most speculative of the questions asked in the 
beginning: Would everything have remained the same if the war had not taken place 
where it did? 
  From today’s vantage point, there is a clear historical thread visible that leads 
from the contestation about Manchuria in the beginning of the 20th century to China’s 
two most important and problematic relationships that formed until the middle of the 
century: the relationship with Japan, and the relationship with Russia. The victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War constituted the basis for Japan’s continuous aggression in China: 
without 1905 no 21 demands in 1915 and without these, there would have been no rise 
of an aggressive Chinese nationalism (in the course of the May Fourth Movement). This 
                                                           
142
 In German translation: “Blumen der Frühe, am Abend gelesen,” in Werke in sechs Bänden, vol. 3, p. 
98. This passage is dedicated to his professor of anatomy Fujino Genkurô. 
143
 Lu Xun points out as an example that his good grades aroused the suspicion amongst his classmates 
that he had gotten to know the examination questions in advance (ibid. pp. 96-97).  
144
 It should be borne in mind that Lu Xun as a writer would not have provided an unfiltered memory. Cf. 
Raoul Findeisen, Lu Xun: Texte, Chronik, Bilder, Dokumente, Basel, 2001, p. 635. Lee even goes so far 
as to question the authenticity of this story as a whole since the specific slide could not yet be found. See 
Leo Oufan Lee, Voices from the Iron House. A Study of Lu Xun, Bloomington, 1987, pp. 17-18, p. 203, 
note 61. However, similar pictures existed quite numerously at that time. Cf. also Findeisen’s reference to 
Lu Xun nianpu [Chronology of Lu Xun] for some examples.   
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aggressive nationalism was directed primarily against Japan – not the least because of 
the Japanese invasion of, again, Manchuria in 1931, peaking in China’s most bitter 
experience of the 20th century: the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). On the 
other hand, the idea of “special relations” between China and Russia had been salvaged 
into Soviet times, which first and foremost kept as heritage from 1905 not the war but 
“revolution”: be it framed in Sun Yatsen’s terms or in Marxist-communist terms. After 
the relative loss of power in Manchuria in 1904/5, Russia’s temporary image as an 
aggressor faded145  – which helped her functioning as a model in the decades to come. 
Also regarding the role of the US, the mediator of the peace treaties which acted 
powerfully in the background, there is some continuity from the Chinese historical 
perspective – up to the Second World War. 
 From the perspective of the other countries that were directly or indirectly 
involved in the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria was certainly not the only powder keg 
in the world at that time. However, due to the geographic constellation, Manchuria 
(together with Korea) brought with Japan a “global player” onto the international stage 
that would not have gotten involved elsewhere. That the war in Manchuria had in itself 
a very high potential for internationalisation was very clear,146 so that it was, in fact, 
only the prelude of what was going to happen in World War One.147 Hence, in view of 
the history of the first half of the 20th century, Owen Lattimore’s description of 
Manchuria as “the cradle of conflict” is indeed very accurate. The physical location of 
the Russo-Japanese War had therefore definitely much more historical relevance than 
only for later developments in China. 
                                                           
145
 De facto, Russia continued to have some influence in Manchuria also after 1905 and repeatedly made 
further “unequal” contracts with China. However, the Soviet’s reference back to the Russian 1905 
Revolution and their rejection of the tsar’s foreign policy, which was about Outer Mongolia primarily, let 
the Chinese forget quickly about this interim phase of renewed Russian aggression. Soviet foreign policy 
explicitly aimed at reactivating the “myth of the ever special and friendly relationship”. On this, see Paine, 
op. cit.   
146
 Primarily, the danger was the activation of the respective alliances (Russia-France, Japan-Great 
Britain). Great Britain had a massive conflict of interest with Russia anyway which partly also affected 
Chinese-controlled territory – e.g. Tibet.   
147
 Hence the discussion of “World War Zero”. Cf. Steinberg et al., eds., op. cit.   
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Ill. 1:  
Title page of Eshi Jingwen 
 
 
 
 
Gotelind Müller: Chinese perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War 
 
39 
 
 
 
Ill. 2: 
The powers in China, symbolised by the Russian bear in the North; the Japanese sun in 
the East which points to Korea and Manchuria, has already caught Taiwan and 
indicates interest in the province of Fujian across the strait; the American eagle 
arriving from the Philippines; the French frog arriving from Indo-China; and the British 
watch dog in the middle of China. 
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Ill. 3: 
Russia holds the ring, the Chinese government wants to catch it, France (to the right) 
and Japan (to the left) interfere. 
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Ill. 4: 
The population of Yingkou is bombed out. 
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Ill. 5: 
Title page of Jingzhong Ribao. 
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Ill. 6: 
Image on the right: the Chinese celebrate New Year. Image on the left: Russia is 
holding the melon with a slice in her hand, to the left is Japan with a sword going to 
attack and behind her Great Britain and the US. Aside Russia is France and to the far 
right is Germany. 
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Ill. 7: 
When the Japanese draw their weapons, the Russians meekly ask for pardon. 
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Ill. 8: 
Russian guard-house in Manchuria as a carousel spun by the Russian. 
 
 
 
 
 
Gotelind Müller: Chinese perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War 
 
46 
 
 
 
Ill. 9: 
Chinese neutrality as a balancing on artillery shells. To the right Japan, to the left 
Russia, both holding a match at the blasting cord. 
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Ill. 10: 
To the right Great Britain, at her side Japan who protect together the two little ones: 
the Chinese and to the far left the Korean. 
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Ill. 11: 
The Chinese people (far right) hold a coin to pay for the advancing Japanese while the 
Chinese government holds up the flag of neutrality but behind its back hands to the 
Russian who fears the Japanese a map of the area west of the Liao river. 
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Ill. 12: 
Title page of Xinmin Congbao. 
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Ill. 13: 
Drawings of torpedos in the Xinmin Congbao. 
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Ill. 14: 
Title page of Dongfang Zazhi. 
 
